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Working time has always been considered in France to be an area of responsibility for the State. The 
Acts on the 35-hour working week come therefore from a long tradition of State intervention to 
regulate employment and working conditions. This particular configuration is not found in other 
European countries. 
In this paper is presented the French specificity: a work sharing logic supported by the State. The aim 
at generating employment through a legal reduction of working time brought the government to draw 
up an extremely complex set of Acts. These one are not restricted to defining legal work duration; 
they also advocate reductions in social contributions and give a precise framework to negotiate 
collective agreements. 
A synthesis of the consequences of the 35-hour Act shows that the effects on employment are limited 
(creation of 300,000 jobs), that social relations did not improve and that inequalities among 
employees were accentuated.  
 
 
Key words: reduction of working time, State intervention, collective bargaining, job creation, living 
and working conditions, work sharing, 35-hour working week. 
 




La réglementation du temps de travail en France a toujours relevé de la loi. Les lois instaurant la 
semaine de 35 heures se situent donc dans une tradition française d’intervention de l’État pour 
réglementer les conditions d’emploi et de travail. Cette démarche distingue la France de la plupart 
des autres pays européens. 
Nous présentons dans cet article les particularités de la démarche française : logique de partage du 
travail portée par l’État. La volonté de créer de l’emploi par le biais d’une réduction légale du 
travail a conduit le gouvernement à élaborer une loi d’une grande complexité. Celle-ci ne se limite 
pas à définir la durée légale du travail, elle prévoit aussi des exonérations de charges sociales et 
encadre précisément les modalités d’accords collectifs. 
Un bilan synthétique des conséquences de la loi des 35 heures montre que les effets sur l’emploi sont 
limités (environ 300 000 emplois), que les relations sociales n’ont pas été améliorées et que les 
inégalités entre les différentes catégories de salariés ont été aggravées. 
 
Mots-clefs : réduction du temps de travail, intervention de l’État, négociation collective, création 




In 1998 and 2000, two “Aubry Acts” -named after Martine Aubry, the Minister for Employment and 
Solidarity responsible for them- reduced working time in France to an average of 35 hours per week. 
Even though the reduction of the length of the working week was the flagship policy of Lionel 
Jospin’s 1997-2002 Socialist government, this was not enough for them to be re-elected, contrary to 
their expectations. Was this defeat the unexpected consequence of a measure that was not as popular 
as anticipated, or the penalty for other failures or inadequacies of the Jospin government? Several 
elements contributed to the rejection of the Jospin administration: the perception of rising crime, 
increasing unemployment, and the delaying of any decisions related to retirement issues. The 35-
hour Acts also doubtlessly contributed to this defeat. This observation is borne out by the personal 
failure of Martine Aubry, who was the principal author of the Acts, in the May 2002 legislative 
elections. How did a measure which was, in principle, favourable to workers, end up being judged 
negatively by many of them? This paper will not try to provide a complete answer to this question. It 
will be restricted to examining some of the reasons for the Socialists’ failure by analysing the 
methods used in setting up the 35-hour working week, which illustrate a certain preference in France 
for central State interventionalism, a preference which marks the results of the legislation. 
1. THE FRENCH ROAD TO REDUCING WORKING TIME  
We have already showed in a previous paper the manner in which the French working time policy is 
distinguishable from that of other European nations (Boisard, 1998). We highlighted two aspects: the 
heavy involvement of State in the legislative process, along with the priority given to employment as 
an objective of the Acts. This particular configuration is not found in other European countries with 
the exception of Belgium, which has nevertheless been less systematic in its application of a 
reduction of working time. 
1.1. State intervention 
Right from the beginning, legislation concerning working time in France has been considered to be 
an area of responsibility for the State. The first limits, applied to the length of working time per week 
for children, were introduced through legislation in 1841 (Defalvard, 2003). Of course, other 
countries also had State provisions to set limits for the maximum lengths authorised. However, in 
France, State intervention continued and was extended, in particular through the legal definition for 
the accepted length of working time. Changes in the political colour of governments over the course 
of the decades have not significantly modified this tendency of the State to be involved (Jefferys, 
2002). It was in fact a conservative majority, with the support of modern-thinking industrialists, that 
passed the law on working time for children. The liberal opposition was weak, even more so since it 
was not well represented on the Right, which was more conservative than truly liberal. From then on, 
the reduction in working time and the modification of regulations governing were the result of State 
intervention, in particular the Acts concerning the 8-hour day in 1919, the 40-hour week in 1936 and 
the 39-hour week in 1982.   
Correlatively, employer and employee organisations have usually been incapable of concluding 
agreements in this area, or even of beginning to negotiate. Generally, the State is expected by both 
sides to intervene. Of course, employers would like to limit the introduction of further regulation by 
the State, yet they would also like the law to help control company policies in this area in order to 
avoid unfair competition, whereas the trade unions and other employee organisations would like the 
regulations to be less flexible. The most recent intervention by the government, which introduced the 
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35-hour working week, was thus part of a long tradition. In this area, even negotiation at the industry 
or sector level took place under the shadow of legislation, and often followed it, stipulating the 
specific means of application of any reform within a framework specified by the law itself. This is 
what happened after the laws of 1919, 1936, 1982, and 1998 were passed. There are hardly any 
examples of autonomous negotiation by trade unions and employers’ organisations in this area, with 
perhaps the isolated exception of Renault, where agreements were signed that increased the number 
of paid holidays (Bodiguel, 1968). 
1.2. Work through work sharing 
The Acts on the 35-hour working week had for their first objective to improve the employment 
situation at a time when unemployment was reaching high levels and most unemployment strategies 
seemed to be ineffective. This aim of reducing working time also comes from a long tradition of 
State intervention. Granted, the first laws shortening the working day did not have this kind of 
objective, but from 1936, a preoccupation with employment could be seen in the legislation. Before 
voting on the law, specialists in the “X-Crise” think-tank, who were mostly economists, debated the 
advantages of reducing working time as a means of generating employment for others. (Fischman, 
Lendjel, 1999; Chatriot, 2004, pp.85-87). A movement advocating the principle of the reduction of 
the working week by the State in order to improve the employment situation thus emerged. Under the 
exceptional circumstances of spring 1936, the Act relating to the 40-hour week was above all 
oriented towards improving conditions for workers, but when it was presented to the Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate, the argument for the improvement of the employment situation through the 
mechanism of work sharing also appeared. The left-wing political parties that supported this project 
hoped that the Act would contribute to lowering unemployment whereas the Right expressed their 
scepticism on this point. 
The theme of work sharing returned at the end of the 1970s, during a period when there was a rapid 
increase in unemployment and the government appeared unable to deal with the situation. Supported 
on the Left by the CFDT trade union and the “Échanges et projets” think-tank founded by Jacques 
Delors in 1980, work sharing was reintroduced into the Socialist Party's programme and inspired the 
decree of 16 January 1982 which reduced the length of the working week to 39 hours. The initial 
objective right from this period was to use legislation to reduce the working week to 35 hours, with 
the reduction to 39 hours considered as a step towards achieving this. Between 1978 and 1982, a 
coherent argument was developed to support the idea and to provide it with a theoretical base that 
was more elaborate than the simple arithmetic of work sharing. The General Planning Commissariat 
(CGP) played an essential role in developing these ideas by proposing measures and validating them 
through econometric simulations. This work showed that the reduction of the length of the working 
week had a positive effect on employment under certain conditions: restraining wage increases, 
maintaining the length of time that equipment is used and increasing productivity. From then on, the 
supporters of work sharing on the left of the government adopted these recommendations and tried to 
integrate them into an Act, which then became more complex as a result. Actually, the legislation no 
longer merely aimed to reduce the working week for social progress, but also needed to bring 
together the right conditions for this legal reduction of working time to have a positive effect on 
employment. This process, which was still in its early stages in 1982, was considered doubtful and 
went through several phases of being put aside or forgotten. Nevertheless, it was reborn and 
reinforced at the end of the 1990s. This was the background for the Aubry Acts, which were the 
result of a long tradition of State intervention and experimentation with the idea of work sharing. 
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2. PARTICULARITIES OF THE “AUBRY ACTS” 
Although the “Aubry Acts” are in keeping with this dual tradition of State control and improving 
employment through work sharing, this does not mean that they are any less innovative. Analysis can 
focus on either historical continuity or on innovation, but it is nevertheless difficult to omit 
mentioning links to the past, whether they are explicit or implicit. 
2.1. Genesis of the Acts 
The patent failure of the 1982 law sowed the seeds of doubt among its supporters concerning the 
advantages of reducing working time. Even so, they did not reject it. Instead, they looked for the 
reasons behind the relative failure of the 39-hour week, which according to estimations at the time 
had only created approximately 0.2% to 0.4% more jobs, (Marchand et al., 1983), but above all they 
developed a strategy that was more efficient in providing protection from the pitfalls which had 
appeared. At the same time, some of the Right became pro-work share and proposed their own 
solutions, which were more liberal in their inspiration. The main difference between the Right and 
the Left is found in the role given to the State. For the Right, the role of the State in this area should 
be limited to providing incentives, leaving the initiative to trade unions, employer organisations, and, 
in particular, to companies, which should not be forced to reduce their working time. For the Left, 
the State should impose new norms for everyone and it was legitimate to compel companies through 
legislation: surely, if they were not obliged to do so, they would refuse to reduce working time. What 
was advocated, then, were incentives from one side and obligations from the other, but in both cases 
a central role was assumed by the State. Even on the Right, there was a divergence from their free-
market doctrine, which was criticised by their most liberal wing and employer organisations. 
2.2. The “Robien Law”: incentives 
The contradictions of the Right resulted in a first text, article 39 of the Five-year Employment Law, 
in December 1993. However, this was never put into effect because it was seen as unworkable 
(Rigaudiat, 1994). Following this, those on the Right favourable to work sharing managed to pass a 
better-adapted law in June 1996, the “Robien Law”, named after its leading promoter. This text did 
not impose anything but rather tried to encourage companies to reduce working time through 
granting significant reductions in employer social contributions. Companies were required to commit 
themselves to a collective agreement to reduce working time by at least 10% and to create the same 
proportion of jobs (offensive application) or to maintain the proportion of jobs where redundancies 
were threatened (defensive application). In exchange for this commitment, under the condition that it 
would stay in effect for at least two years, the companies would benefit from a 40% reduction on 
their social contributions in the first year and a 30% reduction for the following six years (Chanteau, 
1999). Through these reductions, a large part of the cost for the company of reducing working week 
was passed on to the State.1  
The effects of this law continued to provide food for thought for those supporters of a reduction in 
working time. The law had some veritable, though limited, success and it would appear that 
incentives alone were not enough to obtain results on a scale commensurate with the employment 
problem. Three thousand companies signed “Robien agreements”, resulting in the creation or saving 
of some twenty thousand jobs. The companies that reduced working time within this framework 
generally obtained a temporary freeze on wages and flexible working hours from the unions. These 
two conditions were considered by several experts as being indispensable for the successful creation 
                                                 
1 95% of increased wage costs in the first year and 75% in the following years, according to the OFCE (Timbeau, 1997). 
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of jobs. The question then arose as to the cost of the measures to the State budget, especially in view 
of the possible extension of the law, which was called for by some at the time, to make it obligatory 
for all. Several simulations were carried out in 1997 and 1998 in order to evaluate the effects of, and 
the cost of generalising, the “Robien measures”, or measures of the same type, combining financial 
incentives, reductions in working time, and employment.  
The OFCE estimated the cost to the State for the creation of a job through these measures at 
39,000 French Francs (5,945 Euros) per year (Timbeau, 1997), whereas the BIPE consultancy firm 
estimated it at more than 50,000 Francs (7,622 Euros) (Chanteau, 1999, p.46). In addition to the cost 
of the reduction of employers’ social contributions, the estimation of the final cost of the measures 
needed to take into account their effects in terms of the growth in the number of wage-earners 
contributing to the social and welfare funds through their payments, as well as in terms of lowering 
unemployment.  These estimations - and in particular evidence that the cost of lower employer social 
contributions was partially compensated for by savings accruing from lower rates of unemployment 
and the increase in the number of people working - were then taken into account by the authors of the 
laws on the reduction of working time. Their ideas were based on generalising the “Robien 
measures” while modifying them in the light of past experience. 
2.3. Objectives 
The objectives of the Acts on the 35-hour working week were on the whole the same as those for 
1982: to create employment, to stimulate collective bargaining, and to modernise and improve the 
organisation of production so as to enhance company competitiveness and improve social well-being. 
But the order of priorities changed. Employment remained the primary objective, but the question of 
collective bargaining was placed at nearly the same level. 
The first priority was thus to improve the employment situation in France, which continued to 
deteriorate with a steady rise in unemployment from 1992. Certainly, the Act of 1982 had shown the 
limits of the effects of a reduction in working time but the causes of this failure were attributed to 
two factors: an insufficient reduction of only 2.5%, but with no reduction in take-home pay. It was 
hoped that a reduction four times greater, without maintenance of wage levels, would yield better 
results. 
But this was not the only objective; the government also hoped that the reduction of working time 
would provide the opportunity and the means to renew collective bargaining, which had shown signs 
of stagnation for several years. Organisations representing both employees and employers had been 
in a state of considerable weakness, while collective bargaining during the period preceding the Acts 
was rare and seldom led to substantial agreements, in particular relating to the question of working 
time. 
Improving the competitiveness of companies was also an objective of the Act, and indeed, a 
condition of its success. The hoped-for creation of jobs would only be durable if companies 
improved their levels of competitiveness. For the government, this was to happen through a 
rationalisation of organisation and the development of more flexible production. It should be noted 
that the government believed itself well-placed to make suggestions to companies as to how to 
improve their efficiency, a typically French technocratic approach, where State agents perceive 
themselves as being more rational than economic actors. This belief allowed the government to 
promote economic rationality and social progress at the same time, without seeing the contradiction 
between the two. 
Was the reduction in working time the real objective of the Acts? Without a doubt, since they really 
did concern reducing the length of working time to 35 hours per week. But this avowed objective 
was above all a means to attain other objectives. The idea of improving social well-being through 
reducing working week, even though it was emphasised, was not a priority and could be sacrificed 
for other objectives, in particular for that of employment. Indeed, if one follows the conclusions of 
econometric models, the creation of jobs depends on an improvement in company competitiveness, 
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which itself depends upon certain conditions: an increase in the time equipment is used, the lowering 
of costs, and a greater flexibility in working time. Wanting to combine all these conditions of 
success, legislators tried to take all of these elements into account when drawing up the Acts, in a 
wish to foster the necessary conditions for success. 
2.4. Mechanisms of the Act 
The main innovation of the “Aubry Acts” is to be found in their mode of operation, which is 
incredibly complex. The complex framework of the Act results from taking into account the lessons 
of past experience and the work undertaken by economists as well as the different objectives 
targeted. With a concern for being both successful and efficient, the Act has tried to integrate all of 
these parameters. 
The “Aubry Acts”, even though the Minister would never admit it, can be seen in part as “Robien 
Laws” applicable to everyone. Actually, they take up, while modifying it, the mechanism of reduced 
employer social contributions as an incentive for reducing working time and job creation. But the 
idea of generalising the measures introduces a contradiction in terms in the sense that they become 
obligatory. The “Aubry measures” try to reconcile the irreconcilable, incentives on one side and 
obligation on the other. Strictly speaking, the mechanism used for incentives relies on a voluntary 
approval that it is expected to be favourable. It is thus incompatible with a legal or regulatory 
obligation, which is the only efficient way to apply the Act to everyone. In order to reconcile the two, 
the government conceived of a two-stage legislative process, the first being one of incentives and the 
second being one of obligation.  
The first Act is not very different from the “Robien Law” from which it has borrowed the general 
economic framework: the reduction of social contributions in exchange for the reduction of working 
time and the creation of jobs. The differences concern the amounts by which company social 
contributions would be lowered. Instead of a proportional rate, the first “Aubry Act” offered a fixed 
amount of lower contributions in order to favour companies that employed unskilled workers and to 
minimise the cost of reducing working time in companies with highly skilled workers. Also, the 
obligations in terms of employment are reduced: 10% more jobs created for a 10% reduction in 
working time for the “Robien Law”, as opposed to only 6% more jobs for the “Aubry Act” (see 
Table 1). As it was considered that companies could increase productivity through a reorganisation 
of production and a higher intensity of work, a declining rate of assistance was introduced. However, 
the main difference was the prospect of the change in the legal length of the working week to 
35 hours on 1 January 2000. This prospect obviously changed the nature of the problem and strongly 
increased the incentives to act in advance of the legal changes.  
Table 1.  
Public Financial Incentives for Companies  
during the Transition to a 35-hour Working Week.  
Comparison of Robien and Aubry Acts 












RWT by 10% Robien 10% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% 
RWT by 10% Aubry signed 
1st semester 1999 
6% 9 000 F 8 000 F 7 000 F 6 000 F 5 000 F 
RWT by 10% Aubry signed 
in 2001 
6% 8 000 F 7 000 F 6 000 F 5 000 F 5 000F 
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Is the reduction of the working week to 35 hours an obligation after all, or can companies choose not 
to reduce their working time? If they are required to apply the letter of the law, then the incentives 
only provide a motivation to apply the Act and not an incentive to change to 35 hours. The first 
Aubry Act did not allow companies to come to any firm decision on this, because the future use of 
overtime was not addressed, and neither was the issue of the level of financial aid, for companies that 
applied the 35-hour week from 1 January 2000.  The overtime system was crucial because maximum 
working time depends upon it, and it sets the real limit to working time. If four hours of overtime are 
authorised per week, companies can retain a 39-hour week with only the small increase in wages for 
overtime to be considered. In 1998, some companies still believed that it was not in their interests to 
programme a transition to 35 hours in spite of the lowered social contributions offered as an 
incentive. Nonetheless, the prospect of the 35-hour week reinforced this incentive. Consequently, it 
was not surprising that a high number of companies chose to benefit from the lowered contributions 
within the framework of agreements on the reduction of working time.  
The incentives are also present in the second Aubry Act, but within a clearly different context. An 
alternative is established between, on the one hand, the signature of an agreement to reduce the 
working week to 35 hours, allowing for a partial exoneration from social contributions even if no 
new jobs are created, and, on the other, only a minimum application of the new legislation. But this 
apparent choice is not really available, at least not for those companies with more than twenty 
employees, because the strict application of the legislation in the absence of a collective agreement 
limits the possibilities of recourse to overtime and flexible working hours.2 The alternative is 
therefore between the signature of an agreement to apply the 35-hour working week, which gives 
access to the lowered contributions, or not respecting the Act. Theoretically, through the 
130 supplementary hours of overtime authorised, companies signing an agreement could in fact 
continue to maintain working weeks that are over 35 hours. Indeed, this possibility allows them to 
continue to have working weeks of 38 hours. The objective of the legislators is, thus, to use the 
provisions provided by the Act to compel all companies to sign agreements on the reduction of 
working time. In fact, practically all companies with more than twenty employees have signed such 
an agreement.  
The lowering of company social contributions contained in the Aubry Acts does not only aim at 
providing an incentive for companies to reduce their working week. It is also supposed to favour 
employment by reducing the actual costs associated with employing people. It is in fact this 
mechanism that is taken up in the second Aubry Act, following research which has attributed a 
positive effect on employment to the lowering of employment costs (Crépon, Desplatz, 2002). The 
second Aubry Act thus combines two elements to increase its impact on employment: work sharing 
and the lowering of costs associated with employment. It can be seen that the impact of the Aubry 
Act on employment depends as much on the effect of lowering employment costs as on the effect of 
work sharing. This represented a real recognition by the legislators of the limits of the work-sharing 
mechanism.  
The advantage of this mechanism is that it permits job creation to be attributed to the reduction of 
working time, at the same time compelling companies to change to a 35-hour week. However, it has 
a macroeconomic cost that risks undermining economic growth at some point. Indeed, the lowering 
of contributions to social security funds by companies entails a reduction in revenues for these funds, 
which needs to be compensated for in some way. The first measures envisaged by the legislators to 
do this were not accepted, and in the end raising taxes may be necessary to make up the lost revenue.  
The Aubry Acts also take into account the lessons learned from both past experience and the 
econometric simulations carried out since 1978. All of these simulations, and particularly the most 
recent ones, pointed to the possibility of work sharing under certain conditions, three of which are 
constantly put forward: wage restraint, increased productivity, and the maintenance of, or increase in, 
                                                 
2 Companies with twenty employees or less benefit from a transitional period during which they have recourse to a higher number of 
overtime hours than larger companies. 
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the time equipment is used.  Legislation was drawn up in such a way as to favour these three 
conditions.  
2.5. Wage restraint 
It is not written in Act that wage increases need to be restrained in companies that apply 35-hour 
working weeks. Article 39 of the Five-year Employment Law of December 1993 required 
companies, seeking to benefit from lowered social contributions, to reduce their working time and to 
create jobs to reduce wages, which was one of the reasons for its failure. Nothing of the sort is in the 
Aubry Acts, which stipulate that employees paid at the minimum wage should not suffer any 
reduction in their wages as a result of the reduction of working time. However, the system adopted 
for index linking the minimum wage aims at reducing company wage costs related to the transition to 
the 35-hour week. To compensate for the effect of the reduction in working time while avoiding 
raising the minimum wage for all workers, the Act has established a guaranteed monthly wage paid 
only to employees changing to a 35-hour week. This covers the difference between the monthly 
minimum wage at the time they changed to 35 hours and the wage they would have earned if the 
hourly minimum wage were applied to the new number of hours worked. It was also planned that 
increases in the guaranteed monthly wage established by the government would be inferior to 
increases in the minimum wage. The government is therefore promoting wage restraint for minimum 
wage earners, and this is thought to have an impact on wages above minimum wage, which the Act 
does not require anyone to maintain. Legislators assured that wage restraint for those earning above 
the minimum wage would be a matter for negotiation at the level of collective bargaining. By making 
collective agreements the necessary mechanism for reducing working time, the government expected 
that the unions would concede wage restraint in exchange for job creation and reducing working 
time. This is effectively what has been observed in the majority of cases.  
2.6. Increases in productivity and equipment use 
To increase productivity and maintain or increase the time equipment is used – necessary conditions 
for the success in work sharing - legislators have included in the Act dispositions that encourage the 
reorganisation of production, the flexibility of work schedules, and the possibility of resorting to 
atypical hours. The points which aimed at attaching companies focused on the numerous possibilities 
provided by the new Acts for the reorganisation of work. The new legislation facilitated flexible 
working hours, permitting their adaptation to fluctuations in demand, whatever their economic 
situation. Moreover, companies were encouraged to re-evaluate their general organisation in order to 
rationalise and increase productivity. For this, the Act includes provisions for the partial financing of 
using consultancy firms to assist company reorganisation in the transition to the 35-hour week.  
The Aubry Acts push to their limits a kind of logic that began with the 1982 decree which allowed 
for greater flexibility in the length of working time on condition that agreements were signed with 
trade unions. In principal, the Act of 1936 forbade variations in the length of the working day. 
However, since 1982, in order to facilitate adaptation to fluctuations in demand and to increase the 
time equipment used, legislation has authorised the suspension of these regulations under certain 
conditions. Since 1982, two different systems have been applied: one that applied the Act of 1936 
(constant fixed hours for everyone), and one that permitted flexibility in working time. Companies 
that wanted to make their working hours more flexible needed to negotiate an agreement with union 
or employee representatives, and to concede something in exchange. This became generalised; 1936 
Act continues to be in effect but does not apply to companies that have signed agreements on flexible 
working hours. Moreover, the concept of calculating hours annually was introduced into the Act. The 
new legal duration of work is no longer simply calculated on weekly basis, but on an annual basis: 
35 hours per week has now become 1,600 hours per year which can be distributed relatively freely. 
The possibility of a pluri-annual distribution of working time has even been opened up through time-
11 
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worked savings accounts which allow employees to bank vacation time from one year to the next. 
The weekly framework, which was considered too restrictive by employers, can thus be replaced by 
a more flexible annual distribution of hours. 
2.7. Re-launching collective bargaining 
Whether it be to benefit from the reductions in social contributions, to make working time more 
flexible, or to benefit from a more favourable system of overtime, companies must sign a collective 
agreement with trade union representatives. Thus, by making benefits contingent on certain 
arrangements, the Act makes, in practice, the negotiation and signing of collective agreements an 
obligation. In order to compensate for the absence of union representation in a large number of 
companies, the first Aubry Act reactivated the “mandate” system of representation. This allows 
companies without trade union representation to negotiate an agreement with an employee 
recognised by a trade union for the purpose. This arrangement has allowed thousands of companies 
to negotiate agreements on reducing working time. Among the agreements on the reduction working 
time, 60% were signed using the mandate system in 1999, while in 2000 only 48% did so, out of a 
total of 27,000 agreements for these two years alone (Dayan, 2002, pp.156-157). 
2.8. Complex Acts 
From these multiple objectives -reducing working time, increasing employment, developing 
collective bargaining, and rationalising company organisation- the end result is an extremely 
complex set of Acts. In effect, the Aubry Acts would not only like to establish a legal working week 
of 35 hours and encourage companies to create jobs, but also to facilitate flexible working hours and 
stimulate social dialogue. This is far removed from the 1936 Act that established the 40-hour 
working week and that could fit on two pages of the Journal Officiel.3 It would be erroneous to call 
the Aubry Acts “35-hour week Acts”. It would be more accurate, as far as their primary objective is 
concerned, to designate them “job creation Acts”. But this would bring to light the absurdity of 
decreeing a reduction in unemployment through legislation. Everyone knows that in a market 
economy one cannot force companies to create jobs. Therefore, it was more sensible to present the 
Acts as being designed to reduce working time.  
Nevertheless, the true objective was the creation of jobs, and all the measures in the Acts were 
focused on this. In certain respects, they are the legislative and legal translation of the conclusions of 
econometric modelling that was used to study the effects of a reduction of working hours on 
employment and job creation. The 35-hour Acts were thus not limited to establishing a new norm for 
working time, but also tried to influence the way this norm was to be applied, and its effects. 
However, the combination of multiple goals within the same text carries the risks of blocking certain 
effects, complicating the implementation of the Act and making it more difficult to control. This is 
because the authors of the Act doubted the automatic effects that the reduction of working time 
would have on employment. Rather, they believed it necessary to add extra dispositions to reinforce 
the effects that were expected from the reduction in working time, like a medication that combines 
several active ingredients to combat an illness. Continuing with this metaphor, one could say that 
from the employees’ point of view, the reduction of working time is the flavouring added to a 
medication to cover an unpleasant taste and make it easier to swallow. The truly active effects are to 
be found in the reduction of employers’ social security contributions and the incentives for 
increasing working time flexibility. 
In the final analysis, the two Aubry Acts form a complex framework of measures that are dense and 
unusually voluminous because of their multiple objectives and the wish to influence their 
implementation by prescribing procedures for the social partners to follow, while at the same time 
                                                 
3 The official publication for French legislation. 
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attempting to take into account the diverse contexts in which companies operate. This complexity is 
not without consequences. The more complex the law becomes, the more difficult it is to understand, 
and for those concerned to apply its measures. Small companies do not have large human resource 
departments and can find it difficult to grasp all the subtleties of the Act. As for employees, the 
various provisions for varying working hours may appear incomprehensible. 
3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE AUBRY ACTS 
The evaluation of the effects of the 35-hour working week has already led to numerous articles and 
books. Even so, it remains a delicate undertaking for several reasons. First of all, even though five 
years have gone by since the promulgation of the first Aubry Act, all the effects of changing to a 35-
hour working week have not yet surfaced, and certain observations have not even been completed 
because of the time required for observation with the available resources. But there is another, deeper 
reason, which impedes analysis. The reduction in working time is not the only change that has 
occurred during this period, and the changes that have been observed could be attributed to other 
factors which may explain them. Thus, economic growth could be an explanation for the rise in 
employment.  To distinguish the factors that have had an effect on employment and to separate their 
individual influences would require the use of hypotheses based on economic theory. We would then 
enter into debates that would be difficult to resolve. For such reasons, the evaluation of the effects of 
the reduction in the working week to 39 hours in 1982 continues to cause debate. A recent article re-
evaluated these effects and concluded that the reduction in the legal working week resulted in an 
approximately 2% increase in job losses due to increased employment costs (Crépon, Kramarz, 2002, 
p.1384), contrary to the hopes of the supporters of the Act. This difficulty in evaluation is the same 
for the 35-hour week, at least for the most controversial question of its effects on employment. The 
Acts have other objectives as well: the improvement of living and working conditions for employees 
and the development of social dialogue. These two points also deserve evaluation even if this is a 
difficult task.  
3.1. The duration of the working week 
There is one point where the efficiency of the Acts on the reduction of working time is incontestable 
and that is in its effect on how long employees work. Companies, whether they are for or against, 
have been implementing the 35-hour working week. To be more precise, it should be added that the 
implementation of the new legislation has been essentially carried out by companies with more than 
twenty employees. By the end of June 2002, 46% of companies with more than twenty employees 
had applied the 35-hour week, compared to only 12.1% of companies with twenty employees or less. 
In total, 49% of employees benefit from a 35-hour working week, whereas only 14.5% of the total 
number of companies have actually implemented it (Sérandon, 2003, p.24). This deviation from the 
Act requires explanation. Since the decrees of 1938, which adapted the 1936 Act on the 40-hour 
working week, it has not been obligatory to adhere to the legally defined duration of working time. 
Rather, this sets a threshold over and above which hours worked are considered as overtime and 
require compensation through higher rates of pay. Because of overtime, the average working week of 
employees can be considerably higher than the legal duration. This was the case during the period 
that followed World War II. The length of the working week at the time was over 50 hours 
(Marchand, Thélot, 1997, p.140). It was only towards the end of the 1970s that the hours actually 
worked per week approached the legal limit of 40 hours (Eymard-Duvernay, 1977).  
Companies thus have the possibility of offering longer hours than the legal limit if they pay overtime. 
The Aubry Act of 19 January 2000 allows companies to legally use a maximum of 130 overtime 
hours annually. Companies with twenty employees or less had a maximum of 180 overtime hours 
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that were to be reduced to 170 hours by 2003.4 This possibility of utilising overtime hours explains 
why companies have not limited their working week to 35 hours and why the average working week 
is still significantly above 35 hours in France. The reduction of working time has thus been effective 
primarily for employees in large companies, while those in small companies have not benefited from 
a reduction to the same extent. The Act is therefore not applied with the same rigour depending on 
the size of the company.  
3.2. Employment 
Employment was the primary objective of legally reducing the working week to 35-hours. It is with 
this in mind that the Acts should be evaluated. The healthy increase in employment between 1998 
and 2002 in France appears to bear testimony to the success of the work sharing mechanisms in 
them. However, everyone agrees that this increase in employment cannot be attributed solely to the 
reduction in working hours. In addition, if the fall in unemployment were to be attributed only to 
these Acts, the reversal of the trend with the subsequent increase in unemployment would also have 
to be attributed to them. Among the two million jobs that were created, a large number was the result 
of economic growth, some were the result of government measures such as subsidised youth 
employment programmes (emplois-jeunes) and some were attributable to the reduced costs of 
employment contained in the Acts, although these are often attributed to the reduction in working 
time. The best way to estimate the consequences on employment of the reduction of working time 
would be to combine several approaches: a comparative approach highlighting the specificities of the 
French approach over the 1998-2002 period, and an evaluation based on data gathered from the first 
companies to introduce the 35-hour week. These approaches do not allow a precise evaluation but 
would at least provide a reasonable general idea of the impact of reduced working time. Comparative 
analysis remains to be undertaken; the hasty comparisons that have been presented to date do not 
allow us to draw any firm conclusions. Nevertheless, they do show that France experienced one of 
the highest increases in the rate of employment in Europe over the 1997-2000 period, but without 
being able to specifically attribute this increase to any single variable.  
The DARES has tried to evaluate the impact on employment of the reduction of working time 
resulting from the Robien and Aubry Acts (Jugnot, 2002). For this, a calculation was made of the 
number of jobs created or saved in the companies concerned, minus the number of jobs they would 
have created in the absence of a reduction in working time. This latter number of jobs was estimated 
from observing the jobs created in comparable companies which stayed at 39 hours during the same 
period. Comparable here means companies which have a similar profile in terms of size, sector and 
previous history of employment growth. In this way, the net effect on employment of the Robien 
Law (offensive application) is evaluated at 7.2%, and that of the first Aubry Act at 7%. In other 
words, these companies experienced a differential increase in their employment of 7.2% for some 
and 7% for the others due to a reduction in working time. By using this method, the DARES 
estimated that the changeover to a 35-hour week “would have been directly responsible for 
approximately 300,000 jobs in the non-agricultural competitive sector over a five year period, or 
18% of the jobs created between 1997 and 2001” (ibid., p.260). If we accept the validity of this 
evaluation, one still needs to take into account that this data was gathered at the end of 2001, and the 
effect is likely to have been subsequently modified, either for the better or for the worse. Besides, the 
calculated net effect conflates the effects of two measures in the Acts: the reduction of working time 
and the reduction of company social contributions. We do not know what would have been the net 
effect if there had simply been a reduction of working time without any reduction in these 
employment costs, or, conversely, the effect of reducing costs without reducing working time. For 
                                                 
4 The “Fillon Act” of 17 January 2003, named after the Minister for Employment, François Fillon, raised the amount of legal overtime 
to 180 hours a year. This will allow companies to maintain, of the foreseeable future a working week of more than 35 hours (Boisard, 
2003). 
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some, simply lowering social contributions without changing the length of the working week would 
have had a greater effect (Cahuc, 2001).  
3.3. Social relations 
One cannot deny the increase in the amount of negotiation between employee organisations and 
employers, or the number of signed collective agreements on the reduction of working time. From 
this point of view, the incentives to negotiate contained in the Aubry Acts have been effective (Erhel, 
Gavini, Lizé, 2003, pp.29ff.). The number of agreements rose from 13,300 in 1998 to more than 
35,000 in 1999, when 80% concerned working time (CGP, 2001, p.254). The number of branch level 
agreements is also considerable: 218 in total. However, this incontestable success needs to be 
regarded with circumspect for one essential reason: trade unions, employer organisations and, in 
particular, companies, had little choice in the matter. If they had not negotiated and come to an 
agreement it would have meant that companies, among others, would have had to forego reductions 
in their social contributions and the possibility of flexibility of working hours, and would have been 
more restricted in their use of overtime. They were forced into negotiation. Has this increase in social 
dialogue had a durable effect on social relations in companies? It is unlikely to the extent that the 
structural causes of the weaknesses of social dialogue are still present, in particular the weakness and 
divisions of trade unionism in the private sector. It was, moreover, paradoxical to ask of the law to 
promote negotiation while the government demonstrated its wish to reduce working time without 
first taking into account the views of employer organisations and unions, and without allowing them 
time for prior negotiation. 
3.4. Living and working conditions 
By reducing the legal duration of working time by 10%, the socialist government could quite rightly 
claim to be improving the quality of living and working conditions for employees. Who is going to 
complain about a shorter working week without any reduction in wages? This goes in the direction of 
social progress and prolongs the long-term trend of reducing working time. However, much to the 
surprise of the socialists, some employees do not consider that this reform has improved their 
situation. Of course, some employees said they were satisfied with the reduction of working time, but 
others considered that their living and working conditions had deteriorated because of the 35-hour 
week. These contrasting opinions can be explained by the diversity of employees’ situations and by 
the multiplicity ways in which working time has been reduced.  
The reduction of working time has taken different forms: a decrease in weekly hours; extra days of 
paid leave chosen either by the employee or the employer, to be taken every month or distributed 
throughout the year and planned in advance or at the last minute; flexible hours according to demand. 
As it turns out, some employees have benefited from reduced working time in a way that is 
compatible with family and social life and that has allowed them to organise their personal schedule, 
while others have seen their employer impose upon them hours that are incompatible with their 
personal lives and do not allow them any control of their time. In terms of time spent at the work 
place, the reduction in working time has often resulted in faster work rates, and the obligation to 
complete, in 35 hours, work that had previously required 39. 
The diversity of working conditions naturally leads to different perceptions. According to available 
studies, 59.2% of employees considered that the transition to a 35-hour week had improved their 
daily lives (Méda, Orain, 2000). However, irregular hours are less appreciated than reductions of 
regular hours. A significant percentage of workers indicated that their daily life deteriorated when the 
reduction in working time led to irregular hours. These statistics should be interpreted with caution 
because they do not take into account all employees affected by the reduction of working time. The 
survey they originate from was undertaken at the end of 2000, among the first companies to 
implement a 35-hour week. However, reductions of working time since then have occurred under 
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Employee Assessments of the Effects of the 35-hour Act on their Living Conditions  
by Mode of Implementation (%) 
Mode of implementation Daily life 
 Improvement Worsening No change 
Change in break times 52.9 19.3 27.8 
Reduction of working time through varying work 
patterns 
53.6 17 29.4 
Days off on a regular basis 70.7 9.5 19.7 
All employees 59.2 28.0 12.8 
Source: The Reduction of Working Time and Lifestyles Survey, MES-DARES, 2001.  
The changes in working conditions have been judged less favourably by employees. According to the 
same study, 28% considered that their working conditions had deteriorated, 26.4% believed that they 
had improved, while 45.6% thought that there was no change. A deeper analysis of the data from this 
study and further monographic studies (Pélisse, 2002) show that the application of a 35-hour week 
has accentuated inequalities among employees. On one hand, the most well-qualified employees, and 
in particular, the majority of managerial staff, have seen an improvement in their living conditions 
because they have managed to keep some control over their working hours. On the other hand, a 
large proportion of lesser-qualified employees, in particular young women, have suffered 
deterioration in their living conditions because of the imposition of irregular hours that disrupt daily 
life. 
3.5. French Specificities 
The process of reducing working time in France over the past few years distinguishes it from most of 
the other European countries (EIRO, 2003). Today, France is the country where average working 
time is the shortest in Europe. According to data provided by Eurostat for 2002 (Franco, Jouhette, 
2003), the average length of the working week in France for full-time employees was 38.3 hours, 
while it was 43.5 hours in the United Kingdom and 39 hours in the Netherlands. But this is not the 
main French peculiarity. Instead, this can be found in the methods used and the objectives of this 
process.  
France is the only European country where the State has intervened to reduce working time by using 
the law as a means to change the employment situation. In other countries, there are two routes to the 
reduction of working time. Firstly, it takes place through trade union action at the branch or company 
level, combining the reduction of working time with the struggle for employment, which is 
particularly the case for Germany. Secondly, as in Sweden, the State intercedes with the aim of 
improving social well-being, and notably of fostering greater gender equality and reconciling 
professional obligations with family life. 
Traditionally in France, the law is considered as a powerful and multifaceted tool for social change 
and all social issues are treated through legislation. This attitude, pushed to the extreme by the last 
socialist government, bears witness to a severe mistrust of the various social actors, including the 
trade unions. Before launching the process of reducing working time, the government summoned the 
organisations representing employees and employers for a summit on 10 October 1997 in order to 
discuss its proposals to fight unemployment and, in particular, possible State intervention on working 
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time. In reality there was no debate but rather a presentation of government policies without any 
account being taken of the objections expressed by the organisations that were present. This 
provoked determined hostility from the main employers’ organisation, the CNPF, later renamed the 
“Medef”. The abrupt way in which the socialist government proceeded, and the refusal to submit its 
proposals to prior negotiation, is the opposite of the Dutch method used during the 1982 Wassenaar 
conference (Bastian et al., 1989). The argument that the different trade unions and employers’ 
organisations would be incapable of reaching an agreement does not justify a government attitude 
that marginalises the social partners instead of bringing them together to reach agreement. 
Another peculiarity of public action in France consists in the attempt to codify everything through 
legislation, thus overloading it, again through mistrust of the unions and employer organisations. 
Thus, Acts are not only generalised, applying to everyone without exception, but also take into 
account specific situations through a series of arrangements, the conditions of implementation of 
which are carefully stipulated.  
This way of doing things has two main problems associated with it. Firstly, it is absurd to apply the 
same length of working time to a construction worker, a supermarket cashier and a marketing 
consultant. The egalitarianism proclaimed in the Act actually reinforces inequalities in working 
conditions. Secondly, attempting to take into account the different contexts within which companies 
operate complicates the Act to the detriment of its overall clarity and any capacity to control its 
application, without necessarily managing to take all possible situations into consideration. This view 
of the law illustrates a strong illusion in France, in particular among the parties of the Left, 
concerning the possibilities of controlling social and economic reality through legislation. This 
illusion, inherited from authoritarian socialism, mixes belief in the absolute power of public action 
and in the rationality of the avant-guard, and a mistrust of social forces due to assumptions of the 
hostility of employers on the one hand and wage earners’ ignorance of their own true interests on the 
other. Under these conditions, sure of the correctness of its analysis and its cause, the government 
has no need to take into account any criticism directed against its action. It only needs to constantly 
communicate its success to obtain the backing of its citizens. 
The strength of government convictions over the reduction of working time rested on two 
foundations. On the one hand, it was supported by the historical myth that assimilates the reduction 
of working time to social progress and to a form of social justice conquered by the forces of progress 
against reactionary forces allied to Capital. To oppose this, would automatically invite being called 
an enemy of social progress and a supporter of reactionary politics (Cahuc, Granier, 1997, p.4). The 
second foundation was that of the economic expertise provided by successive econometric 
simulations, which showed the effectiveness of reducing working time to create employment, and 
which dictated the conditions for its application. The modern allegory of social justice guided by the 
Science of economics comforted the Socialist government in its certainties but made it deaf to any 
criticism and blind to the deficiencies of its action. 
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